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This thesis analyzes Civil Defense within the context of
its contribution to United States national political and
military strategy; reviews its acceptance by and utility to
the American populace; and promotes some recommendations and
conclusions which may be useful to future discussions of the
topic. Included in the thesis and interspersed throughout
are references to the present level of Soviet Civil Defense
preparedness and capabilities based on the most current and
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I. INTRODUCTION
Within recent years there has "been a resurgence of inter-
est and discussion concerning nuclear war. These thoughts
have centered on the subjects of the Soviet will to strike,
the possibility of American strategic inferiority, about
detente, about how the terror of nuclear war can be balanced
the better to avoid the terror, and, lastly, about the role
Civil Defense takes in pondering the unthinkable.
A. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to analyze Civil Defense
within the context of its contribution to national political
and military strategy; to review its acceptance by and utili-
ty to the American populace; and to promote some recommenda-
tions and conclusions which may be useful to future
discussions. Integral to this thesis and relevant to its
objectives is the status of Civil Defense in the Soviet Union
As such, references to the present level of Soviet Civil
Defense preparedness and capabilities will be acknowledged
based on the most current and complete unclassified data
available.
B. US CIVIL DEFENSE THEORY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
The theory of United States Civil Defense has undergone
several permutations since the basic Federal Civil Defense
Act of 1950. The United States all but abandoned the idea of
a strong, coherent passive defense against nuclear attack
3

after the strategic missile began to replace the aircraft.
In the 1950 's, when the United States still enjoyed unques-
tioned nuclear superiority and when bomber attacks whose
approach could be detected hours before they could strike
American cities were the only strategic threat, there were
active plans for evacuation of the cities, but the speed and
apparent invulnerability of the missile erased the margin of
warning time which made them seem realistic.
Strategists reasoned that attempted evacuation with
warning time measured in minutes rather than hours would
create uncontrollable mass panics, adding to casualties
instead of reducing them. Protection of urban populations
against nuclear blast and fire were deemed as too expensive.
By the early 1960's the emphasis was thus shifted to pro-
viding defense against radioactive fallout. Civil Defense
teams surveyed urban structures and stocked them with
survival supplies.
Active public interest in Civil Defense has been predic-
tably inspired at times of acute international tension such
as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, but in this era of
detente with the Soviet Union the possibility of nuclear
attack is far down the list of potential disasters.
This thesis supports the conclusion that the necessity
for a viable Civil Defense still exists. But in order to
fully understand its role, however, one must attempt to
understand United States nuclear strategy.

II. NUCLEAR STRATEGIES AND CIVIL DEFENSE
A. MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION
The concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) prevails
in United States nuclear strategy today. Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown has frequently made statements indicating his
belief in this strategy as has Paul C. Warnke, chief United
States SALT negotiator. 2
This concept holds that an enemy will not strike if he
knows that the retaliation would be devastating beyond words.
As defined by Richard Pipes, its propositions are:
1. All out nuclear war is not a rational policy
option, since no winner could possibly emerge from
such a war.
2. Should the Soviet Union nevertheless launch a
surprise attack on the United States, the latter
would emerge with enough of a deterrent to devastate
the Soviet Union in a second strike.
Question and Answer Session with Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown, at National Press Club Luncheon, Washington,
D.C. .Wednesday, May 25, 1977? Statements by Secretary of De-
fense Harold Brown concerning Civil Defense following
Seminar on Defense Issues, at the University of Rochester,
Rochester, New York, April 13,1977-
2
Mr. Warnke ' s philosophy of nuclear strategy is commonly
known and can be found in numerous of his works as those
referenced in this thesis bibliography.
10

3. Since such a retaliatory attack would cost the
Soviet Union millions of casualties and the destruction of
all its major cities, a Soviet first strike is most unlikely.
Commonly, the theory of MAD is joined with the assertion
that missiles should be aimed at enemy population centers
rather than at strictly military targets so that the warheads
threaten to kill the maximum number of people. The greater
the potential megadeaths, the greater the deterrence.
Mutual vulnerability is therefore a condition of strategic
nuclear stability "if each side offered its vulnerable
population and industry as hostage to the other, neither
would dare to attack." United States policy has been to
"avoid the development of major damage-limiting capabili-
ties through active and passive defenses. Restraint, it was
hoped, would demonstrate to the Soviets that the United
States did not intend to threaten their capability for assured
destruction, and that, accordingly, their basic security was
not endangered . "^ The 1972 treaty limiting antiballistic
missile systems and the Interim Agreement relating to strate-
gic offensive weapons were based primarily on this mutual
vulnerabilty to retaliatory attack concept.
Pipes, R.,"Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight
and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary , v. 64, July 1977.
Report of Secretary of Defense Donald K. Rumsfeld to the
Congress on the FY197B Eudget, FY 1979 Authorization Request
and FY 1978-1982 Defense Programs, p. 63, Government Printing





More recent indicators of the support which the doctrine
of mutual assured destruction receives are the current presi-
dential administration's attempts to incorporate the issue
of Civil Defense into SALT negotiations. As revealed by
President Carter in March, 1977, discussions with the Soviets
were concluded whereby
we (the Soviet Union and the United States)
agreed to study the means by which we
could mutually agree on forgoing major efforts
in civil defense. We feel that the Soviets
have done a great deal on civil defense capabi-
lity, but we would like for both of us to agree
not to spend large sums of money on this effort.
There are many aspects of this equation of mutually
assured destruction that are challenged by other strategists.
One of the glaring anomalies is that the Soviet Union has
never accepted any limits, implied or otherwise, on the
measures it takes for defense of its own population.
In World War II, the Soviet Union lost 20 million of its
7population of 170 million, about 12%; yet despite that the
country emerged stronger politically and militarily than it
had ever been. Such figures are virtually incomprehensible to
most Americans. Since 1775 deaths from all the wars in which
o
the United States has participated are estimated at 650,000 —
fewer casualties than Russia suffered in the 900 day siege
9
of Leningrad in World War II. Clearly, a country that since
Presidential Documents: Jimmy Carter, 1977, "SALT Nego-
tiations With the Soviet Union," 30 March 1977.
7The World Almanac , 1977 p. 330.
8 Idem.
9Pavlov, D., Leningrad 1941




191^ has lost, as a result of two world wars, a civil war,
famine and various purges, perhaps up to 60 million citizens
tends to assess the rewards of civil defense in more realis-
tic terms.
Growing out of this experience, Soviet Civil Defense is
a pervasive compulsory national program with a direct line
of command from the Ministry of Defense down to the local
level. The population is treated as a valuable war asset
and there are, "by most estimates, elaborate plans to evacuate
workers from industrial cities to rural areas where they
would be safe from nuclear blast and fire, but near enough
to commute back to rebuid and run damaged installations.
It should be noted that one of Lenin's most oft-quoted
statements in the Soviet Union, that
The first production force of all mankind
is the worker, the toiler. If he survives,
we shall save and rebuild everything.
has obvious impact on the scenario envisaged by Soviet Civil
Defense planners.
Even allowing for some inevitable overestimation in ana-
lysis, Soviet Civil Defense seems to be a formidable program
whose main tasks, by the Soviets' own pronouncements, are
to protect the population during war; to increase the stabi-
lity of the functioning of the national economy in wartime;
and to eliminate the consequences of an aggressor's attack
The World Almanac , various
13

on peaceful cities and villages. Clearly, the emphasis
placed upon saving the population should lessen the United
States' belief in the Soviets' adherence to the MAD strategy.
B. COUNTERFORCE
A second approach to nuclear strategy is that typified
by a policy of counterforce . This theory has its foundation
in the theories of the nineteenth century strategist, Carl
von Clausewitz, who defined victory as the destruction of
the enemy's battlefield positions. The counterforce theorists
contend that war has not significantly changed since the last
century; the battlefield has simply grown. War is still, as
it was for Clausewitz, an extension of policy by other means.
Although counterforce strategy tends to be more compli-
cated in its details than that of MAD, it is most easily
comprehendable with its central idea that the key to security
is the ability of United States weapons to survive a nuclear
strike and to be capable of destroying the enemy's nuclear
force. Opponents of the counterforce strategy argue that
attempts by each side to attain the capability of annihilating
each other's nuclear weapons would lead to a growing arms race
and make launching a first strike extremely tempting for fear
12the other side would launch one first.
1
1
Literaturnava Gazeta ( Literary Gazette ) interview with
General of the Army Aleksey Ivanovich Radziyevskiy dated 19
January 1977 as quoted from "Soviet Press, Selected Transla-
tions," n. 77-3 (March 1977), USAF Intelligence, Directorate
of Soviet Affairs, (emphasis by thesis author)
12Hoeber, A.M. and F.P., "The Case Against the Case Against
Counterforce," Strategic Review , v. Ill, p. 54, Fall 1975.
14

Despite such criticism at the time, James Schlesinger, while
Secretary of Defense, incorporated counterforce strategy into
United States nuclear policy when he initiated the tactic of
"flexible response" whereby American war plans ranged from
firing one missile to firing them all, at a variety of targets
from economic centers to Soviet missile sixes.
The basic premises of counterforce strategy the con-
cept of selective targeting, limited nuclear war, and the
prospects of surviving and even winning a nuclear war seem to
have increasingly gained a dominant position within Soviet
nuclear strategy since 1953 when Georgi Malenkov fell from
grace in part by arguing that nuclear war would destroy
civilization.
Soviet nuclear strategy seems to include in its initial
targets not the enemy's cities but rather his military forces
and command, control, and communications facilities. Its
primary aim is not to destroy civilians nor to undermine the
will to resist insomuch as it is to destroy the capability
to do so. In the words of Grechko:
The Strategic Rocket forces, which constitute
the basis of the military might of our armed
forces, are designed to annihilate the means
of the enemy's nuclear attack, large groupings
of his armies, and his military bases; to des-
troy his military industries; (and) to disorga-
nize the political and military administration






, Na strazhe mira i stroitel' stva Kommunizma





Assuming that the Soviet Union adheres to the belief that
winning a nuclear war is possible, which indications seem to
intimate, then Civil Defense becomes to them a factor of stra-
tegic significance. In the May 1974 issue of Military Know-
ledge (Voyennyye Znaniya ) , General of the Army Viktor Kulikov
wrote
:
Civil defense is of extreme importance in mat-
ters of preparing the nation for defense. In
interaction with all the services of our armed
forces and under single military command, it
supports the vital activities of the state in
modern warfare conditions.
III. SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE
It is clear from the open literature that the Soviet Union
has for more than a decade devoted substantial effort to
planning for Civil Defense, making significant improvements
in their capability to protect the populace from the effects
of nuclear war. These improvements must have been considered
both significant and successful, for on 16 February 1977
General A.T. Altunin, the Chief of Civil Defense, was promoted
to General of the Army.
It appears that the mainstay of Russian Civil Defense are
the rather detailed crisis evacuation plans which the Soviets
have developed. These plans give the Soviets the ability to
move the bulk of their urban population to surrounding rural
areas, during three to five days of severe crisis, and ro
16

develop a reasonable degree of fallout protection for
14
evacuees and rural residents.
Recent studies indicate that an evacuated population,
with reasonable protection against fallout, has very low
vulnerability against nuclear attack. Models including such
factors as American weapons expected to survive a Soviet
first strike and the portion of Soviet evacuation areas that
could be subjected to blast or fallout levels high enough to
overcome reasonable levels of protection, have shown that
once Soviet cities are evacuated, and shelter developed in
rural areas, it would be impossible for a United States
retaliatory strike, however configured, to substantially or
even significantly increase Soviet fatalities, regardless of
any retargeting of American strategic offensive forces. ^
The potential effectiveness of Soviet evacuation was
assessed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows:
Under optimum conditions, which include a period
of warning and successful evacuation and
other preparations, Soviet Civil Defense measures
could probably reduce prompt casualties .,
among the urban population to a small percent.
As derived from the calculations of the most current
analysis available to this author, "if the Soviet Union
14 . . .This conclusion is based upon analysis of open source Soviet
literature conducted by this author and by such noted autho-
rities as Leon Goure, Harriet Scott, and T.K. Jones. Their
most recent works are referenced in the bibliography.
-'Jones.T.K.
, Effect of Evacuation and Sheltering on Potential
Fatalities From a Nuclear Exchange , Boeing Aerospace, 1977.
Congressional Record
. Proceedings and Debates of the 95th
Congress
.
First Session , v. 123, n. 16, 28 January 1977-
17

evacuates and shelters their population per their established
plans, its losses in a full-scale nuclear war with the United
States would be about four percent, or ten million people,
about half of their World War II losses" and that a "six-
fold increase in the U.S. surviving arsenal would be required
17
to raise Soviet losses to the twenty percent level." (TABLE I)
There are also other dimensions of Soviet Civil Defense
effectiveness in addition to the ability to protect the
general population by crisis evacuation. The Soviet Union
does not regard Civil Defense to be exclusively for the pro-
tection of ordinary citizens. It is also intended to include
protection of the political leadership and of the economic
base, the latter including the industrial managers and skilled
workers, which will help in re-establishing the political
and economic system once the war is over. Soviet Civil
Defense not only plans to limit casualties but also to
administer the country under the stresses of nuclear war and
its immediate aftermath.
The Soviets continue to add to their existing Civil De-
fense capabilities. Since 1974, they have improved and in-
creased shelter designed to protect the general population
in-place with significant blast protection in the event of a
sudden outbreak of war or a rapidly escalating crisis that
precludes sufficient time to evacuate the cities. Although
the extent of this program is not precisely known, there is
evidence which suggests that there is now a considerable
Jones, T.K., op.cit., p. 3.

amount of shelter beneath apartments and elsewhere, with
1 8
construction increasing at an accelerating rate.
In summation, in the opinion expressed by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff in Congressional testimony given in January 1977*
under "optimum conditions," Soviet Civil Defense measures
could probably:
1. assure survival of a large percentage of the
leadership necessary to maintain control;
2. reduce prompt casualties among the urban
population to a small percentage; and
3. give the Soviets a good chance of being able
to distribute at least a subsistence level of
supplies to the surviving population, although
the economy as a whole would experience serious
difficulties.
IV. UNITED STATES CIVIL DEFENSE
In light of the overwhelming evidence regarding Soviet
Civil Defense capabilities, it would seem prudent that the
United States should develop an enhanced Civil Defense to
include a program of evacuation for two reasons:
1. to be able to respond in kind if the Soviet
Union attempts to intimidate the American go-
vernment in a time of crisis by evacuating the
population from its cities; and
1
8
Interview with Mr. Don Hudson, Hazard Evaluation and Vul-
nerability Reduction Division DCPA dated 22 June 1977.
19

2. to reduce fatalities if an attack on United
States cities appears imminent.
As Leon Goure states, "the credibility of deterrence in
the nuclear age depends not only on a country's strategic
offensive capability "but also on its ability to convince
itself, and especially its enemy that it can survive a nuclear
war and, therefore, that it can rationally threaten to resort
19
to war if this proves necessary."
According to Herman Kahn, "any power that can evacuate a
high percentage of its urban population to protection is in
a much better position to bargain than one which cannot do
this. There is an enormous difference in the bargaining
ability of a country which can, for example, put its people
in a place of safety in 2h to 48 hours, and one which cannot.
An unprepared government will have a poor chance of forcing
20
a prepared government to back down."
A. JUSTIFICATION FOR IMPROVED CIVIL DEFENSE
Given the present level of Civil Defense preparations,
the United States is at a severe disadvantage. If, by some
type of measures, casualties could be reduced to a third or
fifth of what they would be under present circumstances, this
could well save the whole national structure from collapse,
and make the risks of an attack upon the United States far
outweigh the probable gain.
19 'Goure, L.
, War Survival in Soviet Strategy , p. 6, University
of Miami, 1976.
20
Kahn, H., On Thermonuclear War. p. 213, University Press, I960
20

Improved United States Civil Defense would redress in
part the present assymetry in population vulnerability, with
potential for a disparity in fatalities of up to ten to one
should a nuclear war ever occur. Many feel that the possibi-
lity of such a large disparity in fatalities, should an ex-
tremely grave crisis arise, would not enhance prospects for
equitably resolving the crisis by negotiations. Improved
Civil Defense, by contrast, could contribute to equitable
resolution of a grave crisis, in that the potential vulnera-
bility of the two populations would be more nearly equal.
Unless the American government can be assured that nuclear
war is unthinkable for the Soviet Union and all indica-
tions are otherwise it must be made survivable for the
United States.
Within the framework cf this goal, the Defense Civil
Preparedness Agency (DCPA), reached these basic conclusions
in the early 1970' s:
1
.
An attack upon the United States would very
likely be preceded by a period of international
tension or crisis. This could constitute
strategic warning and provide time for protec-
tive actions to be taken.
2. If an attack should occur, the primary enemy
targets would probably be United States missile
sites and other strategic military installations
(TABLE II)
3. Blast and fire would endanger mainly people
living or working in areas near military targets,
21

k. Extensive fallout shelters exist throughout
the United States and more are being identified.
5. It may be feasible, when an international
crisis threatens to result in a nuclear attack,
for residents of high-risk areas to be tempo-
rarily relocated in small town and rural areas,
where nuclear weapons would not be targeted,
provided these people could be protected against
radioactive fallout and provided with food,
water, and medical care.
B. CURRENT CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM
The current-level United States Civil Defense program
stresses protection of the population in case of nuclear
attack upon the United States. A nationwide effort which
began in the 1960's identified some 230 million fallout-
protected spaces in larger existing structures, and planning
from the mid-1960' s to date has stressed use of such shelters
to protect the population "inplace" that is, at or near
to residences, schools, and places of work.
Crisis buildup actions ("surging") are currently relied
upon to develop or to bring to readiness many of the elements
that would be required for operations to protect the popula-
tion in-place under attack conditions. Requirements for
"surging" include stocking shelter spaces with food and water;
marking buildings with shelter signs; training shelter mana-
gers, radiological defense officers, and radiological monitors;
developing local readiness to conduct emergency operations;
22

and providing training and education for the public on survi-
val actions. Reliance on crisis buildup actions has been
necessitated increasingly since the latter 1960's due to pro-
gram and budget decisions.
It is not possible to predict with precision how well the
current Civil Defense system would function in an attack
occurring after one week, one month, or one year of crisis
buildup action. Many variables would affect the performance,
one of the most important being the promptness with which
national authorities decided that buildup actions should be
undertaken, as well as the effectiveness of state and local
officials in implementing such actions. However, DCPA esti-
mates that if a large-scale attack occurred after an intense
crisis of about one week, the current Civil Defense system
would result in adding some twenty-five to thirty million
survivors, that is, in total survival of about 105 to 110
21
million, based on protecting the population m-place.
C. CRISIS RELOCATION PLANNING
A second option for population protection is much more
recent. This concept, still being refined, plans for the
contingency of Crisis Relocation Programming (CRP) defined
as the evacuation of high-risk areas when a nuclear attack
threatens, and the temporary relocation of the residents of
those areas into small towns and rural sites, called "host
areas," where nuclear blast and fire effects are not likely






to occur. The basic rationale behind CRP is that it has a
lifesaving potential of some ?0 to 80 million additional lives
for a total survival of nearly 180 million in a large-scale
attack. 22 (TABLE I)
The crisis relocation option includes state and local
planning for:
1. Allocation of risk-area populations to
appropriate host areas.
2. Host-area reception and care, including
provision of fallout protection and preparation
of standby emergency information materials for
the public.
3. Logistical support for relocated people.
4. Risk-area operations including initial relo-
cation of people, security measures to keep
essential industry in operation in the risk
areas, and furnishing of best-available blast-
protection for persons who would be in the risk
areas in the event of attack. Workers in key
industries which must operate during a crisis
period would be relocated, with their families,
to close-in host communities from which they
could commute to work during the crisis period.
Crisis Relocation Planning has peacetime as well as war-
time value. It can be used to protect people not only from





developing natural disasters, such as hurricanes and flood;
certain types of peacetime accidents, such as those resulting
in the release of harmful or lethal fumes or chemical agents
into the atmosphere or nuclear power plant mishaps; and
threats from terrorists who, using purloined fuel from
nuclear power reactors, fashion a nuclear device in an extor-
tion attempt involving the threat to detonate a nuclear
device in an American city.
-This crisis evacuation capability, when fully developed,
is to provide an option or alternative to in-place protection.
The latter will continue to be essential, however, because it
is possible that the decision will not be made, during a cri-
sis, to excecute evacuation plans or if the decisions were
finally made that time available before attack would per-
mit only partial evacuation of risk areas.
The most critical requirement, therefore, is that the
National Command Authorities determine that the United States
is not only involved in a crisis which may escalate to nuclear
attack, but that the potential severity of the crisis makes
it essential that Civil Defense buildup actions be commenced,
despite the economic costs and domestic and international
impacts to be anticipated. Once this decision to evacuate
the population is made, it is essential that there be time
enough before the potential attack to generate the Civil
Defense capabilities planned and that state and local
authorities make highly effective use of the time available.
This effectiveness is a function of the adequacy, extent,
and status of planning.
25

DCPA ' s present estimate is that completing contingency
planning for crisis evacuation will require some eight years.
An initial, low confidence capability is expected to be at-
23tained within about three years. J This includes identifying
host areas to accomodate evacuees from each risk area, as
well as preparing preliminary, public information materials
for crisis publication on "where to go and what to do" if
evacuation is advised by national authorities. This preli-
minary planning will be followed by development of more de-
tailed plans covering host-area operations to provide food,
lodging, fallout protection, and other necessities for eva-
cuees; as well as risk-area operations to keep essential
industrial services in operation.
Special solutions for areas such as the Northeast urban
corridor, the Great Lakes area, and California probably will
require a minimum planning time of nothing less than five
years, due to the need for host-area shelter data to acco-
modate the large numbers of people affected. The larger
cities in these most heavily urbanized parts of the United
States contain about half of the population of all the coun-
try's risk areas2 -5 (TABLE III) and the potential total effec-
tiveness of crisis evacuation will be affected substantially
by the nature of the plans to be developed for them.
23^Interview with Mr. William Chipman, Deputy Assistant Direc-







V. CIVIL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC OPINION
It is relevant to ask whether one may realistically expect
Civil Defense to be improved during a period of increased ten-
sion or even whether public opinion will support efforts to
enhance Civil Defense. Civil Defense is the element of national
security most closely related to the citizenry, for Civil De-
fense readiness must be developed where the people are, in
jurisdictions throughout the country.
When aroused by international events, public opinion is
extremely volatile. High points of public concern occurred
in the late 1 9*4-0 ' s and early 1950's, during the 196l Berlin
crisis and during the Cuban crisis in 1962. The public's
very understandable and sensible concerns during crisis periods
center on such questions as, "What should I do?" or "Where is
my shelter?"
.
During periods of low tension, in contrast, the public is
passive. Attitude surveys over a period of two decades show
that while people do not hold intense views on the subject of
Civil Defense, they are nevertheless strongly, almost over-
whelmingly, in favor of the program. Nearly 90 percent of
the public favors Civil Defense; all kinds of Civil Defense
fallout shelters, blast shelters, evacuation/relocation.
Few government programs, if any, command such a broad base
27

of popular approval. Civil Defense, in fact, is an issue on
26
which something akin to national consensus exists.
But it is also clear that the public regards Civil Defense
as a primarily governmental responsibility, not an individual
exercise. People associate Civil Defense with national defense,
and have great faith in the Federal Government's judgements.
27
Indeed, they believe that what needs to be done is being done.
The near-consensus attitude does not apply to a convinced
and vocal minority of a few percent. Opposition sentiments
are couched in a broader ideological conception of the world's
strategic environment. Reinforcing philosophical attitudes
are popular notions about nuclear war. Opposition is usually
related to peace or war issues, completely independent of
civil preparedness questions. Civil Defense is futile to
some because it cannot promise to save all. Or the post-
attack environment is believed to be too hostile for human
survival. At the other end of the spectrum are those who fear
that defense can be made too effective, or may appear so.
This, it is feared, may make nuclear war "thinkable" to
the decision makers and perhaps to the population at large.
It would appear that the question of what Civil Defense
program the United States should have is an issue for decision
makers. In normal times, the issue will be one of low sali-
ency for most people, and little is likely to be heard save
2f>
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency Report 17. Civil Defense
and the Public , by R. L. Garrett, revised December 1976 and
American Institute of Public Opinion, Gallup Opinion Index --




from from among that small percentage who are opposed in prin-
cipal to the program. There is certainly little likelihood
of popular clamor or public demand for Civil Defense bar-
ring a severe crisis. As President Kennedy observed in 196l
,
"Those matters have some rhythm; when the skies are clear, no
one is interested. Suddenly, then, when the clouds come
after all, we have no assurance that they will not come
28then everyone wants to find out why more has not been done."
Vlhatever decisions are made should be arrived at, it would
appear, in the knowledge that the public believes that "the
government is taking care of Civil Defense." This is similar
to the situation in other defense related areas, where little
is ordinarily heard from the public at large with respect to
whether there should be a new weapon system developed for
the inventory. It is not dissimilar to many issues at the
local level, where, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
the public assumes that the local government is "taking care
of" police and fire protection and other such municipal
activities.
Kennedy, J. F.
, speech presented before Congress dated May
1961 excerpted from "In the Event of Catastrophe," broadcast
on PES 15 February 1977.
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VI. CRITICISMS AND REBUTTALS OF CIVIL DEFENSE 29
Concern is sometimes expressed that a revivified Civil
Defense program will lead to alarm, anxiety, or despondency
among the public at large. In fact, the Civil Defense program
can be, has been, and undoubtedly should be conducted in an
orderly, non-dramatic, and low-profile manner. A program
much more ambitious than the current one can be conducted
in as similar a manner. People have too many other concerns
to become particularly aroused over occasional news of Civil
Defense activity, and all evidence is that if they do notice
such an item, they will approve, inasmuch as it is something
they expect the government to be doing.
Unfortunately, some of the present governmental leaders
who should be concerned about Civil Defense view it quite
differently than what the general population does.
In response to a question concerning Soviet Civil Defense,
following a seminar on defense issues at the University of
Rochester on 13 April 1977, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
said, "I don't think there is any chance in the world that
you could do that kind of a (Civil Defense) program in the
29The criticisms presented are not characteristically
attributable to any particular persons. They are, however,
indicative of general arguments encountered by the thesis
author and are presented as such.
30American Institute of Public Opinion, op.cit.
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United States and that says something good about the United
States, in my opinion, and it says something bad about the
Soviet Union that they can do it."
During the same session, while answering another question
on United States Civil Defense structure since I960, Harold
Brown responded:
In this country, there was a substantial effort
to get Civil Defense underway as a way of reduc-
ing the casualties should a thermonuclear war
take place in the early 1960's. In every event,
it turned out that the elaborate manuals that
were written and distributed, the efforts to
make shelter spaces, the possible plans for
evacuation, came to very little. I believe that
is because it is very difficult, and this is not
saying something bad about our society, maybe
it's saying something good about it, to produce
the kind of discipline and control that would
go with, I won't say a successful Civil Defense
program because I'm not sure that any Civil De-
fense program of reasonable magnitude would be
successful in allowing the country to recover
from a thermonuclear attack, so I won't say
producing a successful Civil Defense program or
an effective one, but in producing a large scale
one that the citizens actually subscribe to and
train under and are prepared to use.
There is little likelihood of the dramatic, even the melo-
dramatic, impacts upon society apprehended by those opposed
to Civil Defense for the United States, sometimes extending
to visions of "compulsory Civil Defense," or even of a "gar-
rison state." A moderate but effective program does not have
inherent in it potential for much drama, let alone melodrama.
Another criticism that has been advanced is that crisis
relocation plans for the United States would be ineffective
without a willingness to rehearse plans on a large scale,
involving the public in practice evacuations. It has been
suggested that without rehearsals, chaos or panic would ensue
31

at the time of implementation. In fact, experience in actual
evacuations is to the contrary. The effectiveness of opera-
tions is a function of the competence of planning, and the
degree to which plans, once developed, have been rehearsed
in periodic exercises involving only key officials of govern-
ment. What is important is to conduct exercises simulating
implementation of evacuation plans, involving the local and
state officials who would be responsible to make the plans
work. Experience in disasters that have been studied inten-
sively is that the population wants and seeks guidance from
their governmental leaders in times of stress, and that the
great majority will act in accordance with official instruc-
tions. -*
There have been many major evacuations from such threats
as hurricanes and floods, and these have been routinely suc-
cessful despite the fact that there have been no rehearsals
before the fact involving the public. Hurricane Audrey in
1957, for example, killed some 590 people in Cameron Parish,
32Louisiana.- This stimulated hurricane evacuation planning,
and when Hurricane Carla threatened the Gulf Coast in 196l,
the plans were implemented and between half anr1 three-quarters
of a million people were moved inland from coastal areas in
33Louisiana and Texas. J
31 Defense Civil Preparedness Agency Report 17, op.cit., p. 17.
32The World Almanac




. 1961 . p. 122.
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Yet another criticism of Civil Defense and Crisis Reloca-
tion Planning arises from an underlying "belief that the impact
of an attack on industry, food processing, and other economic
assets would be so great that even if most of the population
did survive the attack, the nation could not recover and re-
gain the status of a twentieth century military and industrial
society. This view is sometimes dramatized in observations
to the effect that a Civil Defense system effective in adding
survivors could result in an attacked nation having too many
people, or in being "people-rich." However, both postattack
recovery studies and post-World War II experience in Japan,
West Germany, and the Soviet Union have shown that the skills,
knowledge, and motivation of the surviving population are what
is most important for recovery rather than industrial plant. J
Because reconstructing the preattack economy would initially
require large amounts of less-skilled labor before higher
technology industries could be restored, postattack recovery
must indeed be based on being "people-rich."
Lastly, the point is sometimes made that there is no need
to enhance United States Civil Defense because deterrence,
based on American assured retaliation capabilities, will not
fail. The thought is sometimes added that should Soviet
leadership appear not to understand the potential impact of
American assured retaliation, all that would be necessary
would be to disabuse them of such false perceptions, apparently
34w_ ,Joint Committee on Defense Production, Ninety-Fourth Congress,
Second Session, "Yn'dustrial Survival and Recovery After Nuclear
Attack," 18 November 1976.
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by more clearly explaining these capabilities to them. It
is apparent that indeed it would be prudent to enhance
United States Civil Defense because of the possibility that
deterrence could fail, due for example to an irrational
attack, a miscalculation, an accidental war, or a war of
escalation. Deterrence is in essence the state of mind of
Soviet leaders and it is not impossible that they could
calculate (or perhaps miscalculate) that they could emerge
from a nuclear exchange with not unacceptable losses,
regardless of the clarity with which United States assured
retaliation capabilities had been described to them.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted that should deter-
rence fail, "to the extent escalation cannot be controlled,
the United States objective is to maximize the resultant poli-
tical, economic, and military power of the United States relative
35to the enemy in the post-war period." If the objective of
American offensive forces, should deterrence fail, is to retard
Soviet ability to recover more rapidly than the United States,
and to maximize American post-war power relative to the enemy
it would make sense to improve Civil Defense, to enhance Ameri-
can survival thereby helping to maximize American post-
war power and thus contributing to attaining the same objec-
tive as that set for American strategic offensive forces.
Some proponents of Civil Defense adhere to the concept that
improved Civil Defense certainly can and perhaps should be
35Congressional Record , Proceedings and Debates of the 95th
Congress
, First Session, v. 123, n. 17, 31 January 1977.

justified in its own right, without regard to the strategic
balance. Civil Defense is thus seen largely as a hedge against
the failure of deterrence and as decoupled from strategic con-
siderations.
As defined in the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. Civil
Defense embraces measures to reduce the impact of enemy attack
upon the United States, including protection of both life and
property. On 8 June 1977 the United States recommitted itself
to this principle on an international level by adopting the
Protocal Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
19^9 Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Humanitarian Lav/ Applicable in Armed Conflicts, held in Geneva.
Upon consideration and approval of the government, as a signa-
tory, the United States (as does each party) "shall, to the
maximum extent feasible endeavour to remove the civilian
population (meaning its own civilians) from the vicinity
36
of military objectives " J The Federal Government has
always had a constitutional duty to provide for the common
defense and protect people from hostile threats. Moreover,
Civil Defense should be provided because of the fundamental
importance and value accorded to the individual under American
moral and ethical values.
In May 1961, President Kennedy said that his administration
had been "looking hard at exactly what Civil Defense can and
?6
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development
of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts,
Draft Additional Protocol I, Article 51 adopted by Committee




cannot do. It cannot be obtained cheaply " but "Civil





Within the context of President Kennedy's statement lies
the gist of the first recommendation which this author views
as necessary to developing a viable Civil Defense. Just as
with any other insurance, the cost is fairly high. The scope
of the protection which Civil Defense can offer makes the
price seem exorbitant PONAST II estimates the cost at
12 billion dollars or 50 dollars per person. But the return
is also high. With a nation-wide evacuation plan and an up-
dated fallout shelter program, 93 percent of all Americans
could survive a nuclear attack. Today's Civil Defense budget
is approximately 90 million dollars or about 50 cents per
person. Although different studies have derived different
estimates, all are beyond reach of this budget. Clearly an
increase in funding is required.
B. PROTECTION OF INDUSTRY
Another aspect of American society whose survival in war
can be greatly enhanced but which has been largely ignored by
Civil Defense planning is the industrial plant of the United
States. The current United States Civil Defense planning does
37,.Kennedy, J. F. , loc.cit.
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not include provision for physical protection of key industrial
equipment. The reason is that until very recently, it appeared
that such protection would be prohibitively expensive. Esti-
mates indicate that the cost of protecting all industry in the
United States is 2 to 3 billion dollars, half the price of
insurance against other hazards which industry maintains.
During 1976, Boeing Aerospace Company developed and tested
techniques for protecting industry by actions that could be
taken during several days of severe crisis. The essence of
the Boeing work is that simple measures could dramatically en-
hance the survivability not of an entire plant but rather of
the critical equipment within the plants. For example, cover-
ing large machine tools with polyethylene and then either
sandbags or loose earth could provide protection against blast
overpressures of from ^0 to 80 pounds per square inch (5500 to
3750 feet from a typical one megaton Soviet weapon), as well
as against fire (which was the primary damage agent at Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki). Preservation of the equipment v/ould per-
mit resumption of production within several months, as
protection from the elements was improvised and other arrange-
ments made, for example, for provision of electric power and
other inputs to production.
Jones, T. K.
, Industrial Survival and Recovery After Nuclear
Attack
.
Boeing Aerospace Company, 1976.
39Davis, L. E. and Schilling, W. R.
, "All You Ever './anted to
Know About MIRV and ICBM Calculations But Were Not Cleared to
Ask," Journal of Conflict Resolution , v. 17, p. 21^, June 1973-
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In view of the importance of industry to post-attack
recovery, Civil Defense planning should incorporate the ne-
cessary procedures for protection of industry. This can be
accomplished by the following recommendations:
1
.
Local area industries designated as vital due
to the need to continue operating during a crisis
should take an active role in Crisis Relocation
Planning, in order to provide for commuting by
pre-assigned key workers.
2. Major corporations should work to adapt and
apply the Boeing concepts and approaches for
countering nuclear weapons effects. Preparation
of a plan showing in specific detail how to pro-
tect the facility by actions to be taken during
a crisis are necessary.
Additional research should be undertaken on strategies
and approaches for industries where expedient (crisis) har-
dening techniques do not appear as promising as in the case
of industries where machine tools are central to production.
It does not, for example, appear that crisis hardening with
earth or sandbags would be feasible for refineries, but there
are other approaches which could substantially enhance pros-
pects for post-attack recovery such as expedient production
techniques for post-attack use, innovative storage measures,
and drastically modified usage patterns.
For example, post-attack substitution possibilities might
include greater reliance on diesal fuel which can be produced
using simplified refining techniques. Also, certain long lead
38

time items could be hardened during a crisis or dispersed from
risk areas. Innovative storage might include use and disper-
sal of tank trucks and railroad tank cars.
Similar preparations should be made for other industries
such as steel and industrial chemicals. The proper combina-
tion of protective, recovery, and use-pattern measures would
be different in each industry. The problems are many, but
not insurmountable. The coordinated planning for protection
and recovery of industry would yield rewards greatly in excess
of costs should the need for their implementation ever arise.
C. CIVIL DEFENSE AND SALT
As indicated earlier in this thesis, President Carter has
directed United States negotiators to include Civil Defense
issues in future SALT agreements. This is perhaps unfortunate.
Arms limitations and disarmament are quite consistent with
Civil Defense, for both attempt to reduce the level of destruc-
tion of wars. But while the United States may gain through
symmetrical or parallel offensive weapon reduction, it would
not be as likely to gain through symmetrical or parallel Civil
Defense limitations. Indeed, the opposite is more likely to
be true. There may be a sound basis for United States/ Soviet
Union cooperation, but not control or limitation, in Civil De-
fense. Were the United States more effectively provided with
Civil Defense capabilities, inspection requirements for future
arms control agreements could be reduced and comprehensive
arms control would be made more feasible and therefore more
3?

likely for a well-defended country is not so vulnerable
if an agreement is violated.
The administration's comments regarding Civil Defense raise
the question of whether agreements can be negotiated with the
Soviets to prevent their plans for Civil Defense from being a
destabilizing factor in measuring the East/ West balance of
pov/er. If one is to believe the recent intelligence reports
and, indeed, even President Carter's own admission, it is ob-
vious that nothing short of a unilateral dismanling of Soviet
Civil Defense would succeed in establishing a Civil Defense
parity. Such an expectation must surely be included in the
category of "wishful thinking."
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, Civil Defense in the United States can play
two roles: l) as insurance; as one aspect of the government's
responsibility to defend the people against disasters, what-
ever their cause; 2) as a strategic element; in severe crises
a Civil Defense capability aids the resolve of decision-makers
facing the pressure of aggressive, reckless, or foolish oppo-
nents, either from within or externally. This last may in-
crease stability not only by increasing extended deterrence,
but for psychological reasons. A leader who is able to mea-
sure what is at risk and perceive its limits may be less likely
to panic, to lose control, to bluff unrealistically , or to let
others unreasonably tempt or pressure him than one who visua-
lizes nuclear war as the end of his society and cannot examine




The capabilities most appropriately added to the current
posture, in an era of detente, are those provided by Civil
Defense. Such capabilities can buy much more damage-limiting
potential than comparable funds for offensive weapons. But,
as this author believes, Civil Defense needs steady support
from the Executive Office if it is to achieve even modest
goals for protecting the population. If a substantially
larger Civil Defense program than the current one were effec-
tively supported by the Administration not as a response
to new dangers, but rather as insurance and as a further ra-
tionalization of our strategic defense posture toward a more
balanced and stable international situation then Civil
Defense programs could provide, over a period of a few years,
a reasonable degree of protection for the country.
It is clear that there are never absolute guarantees of
security. One cannot properly judge a program by asking, "Is
it guaranteed to work?". A more useful criterion is the
standard implied in such questions as, "Under what circumstan-
ces does the program do useful things?"; "Are these circum-
stances sufficiently likely and are the results useful enough
to justify the various costs and disutilitie ; of the program?"
Therefore, whether one argues for Civil Defense on purely pru-
dential grounds, or on general military and foreign policy
grounds, it is a subject necessary to consider, for it is one
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